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1. Introduction 
China is the world’s second largest economy today. GDP growth over the past 3 decades 
has outpaced the ‘miracles’ posted by other ‘developmental states’ in East Asia, namely 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Chinese per capita income relative to US levels 
(in PPP terms) may be at present roughly equal to where South Korea was situated 
economically relative to the USA in the mid-1990s, namely, far behind. Two decades on, 
South Korea's per-capita GDP is almost 2/3 of that of the USA. However, income distribution 
in China today is much more unequal than in 1990s South Korea.1 This naturally begs the 
question of how proximate Korean and Chinese economic policies have been; more 
importantly, it begs the question whether South Korea's path might indicate the much bigger 
Chinese economy could avoid a social backlash in the face of growing inequality, and one 
day perhaps catch up perhaps with American living standards.  
 
The institutional foundation of China’s success have been the subject of research in 
political economy. Many scholars sought to explain how this spectacular economic 
expansion was constituted by -- a self-perceived or substantive -- historically exceptional 
‘China model’ (Arrighi, 2007; Naughton, 2010; Breslin, 2011; Bell, 2015; cf. Perkins, 2013). 
Others have questioned whether the Chinese developmental experience was underpinned 
by structures similar to those of East Asian ‘developmental states’ (Baek, 2005; Boltho and 
Weber, 2015). There is, quite clearly, no theoretical consensus on the Chinese growth story.  
  
This paper addresses this controversy from a broad historical and geographical 
framework. It begins from the presupposition that comparisons between different political 
economies would be incisive only if they are historically grounded and incorporate 
geographically variegated expressions of development. While policies in post-Mao China 
might look much like those of other countries, they are on occasion simply concrete 
extensions of institutions, interests and ideas inherited from the Mao era or earlier. On the 
other hand, the Mao legacy as a whole should not be simplistically contrasted with 
developmental statism as key parts thereof, e.g. rural land distribution in the early 1950s, 
aligned in fact with coeval policies in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Perkins, 2013; 
Studwell, 2013).    
                                                          
1 Data adapted from IMF World Economic Outlook Database, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx; See also Kroeber (2016), pp. 9-12. 
Whilst facets of the Chinese economic miracle might bear similarity to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan in terms of 
technological catch-up -- the latter three, unlike low-income China, all eventually softened up politically; they 
embraced social welfare to a much greater extent and permitted more popular participation (Kim, 1997; Hu, 
2005; Wong, 2006; Morley, 2015).  
 
 States drive and adapt to fluid processes, often calling into question the utility of 
comparative prototypes (for an excellent discussion see Peck and Theodore, 2007; Peck 
and Zhang, 2013). A more incisive form of analytical comparison should therefore take into 
account the constitutive roles of China’s multifaceted economic history and geography. This 
is the overarching aim of the critical review presented in this paper. 
 
Here, whilst broadly accepting post-Mao China to be an East Asian developmental 
state on most counts, we aim to originally contribute to the existing body of pertinent 
scholarly literature by capturing the fluidity and distinctness of the Chinese trajectory. To that 
effect, the ideological origins and legitimacy of the Chinese variant of the developmental 
state are sought earlier back in time: we situate Deng’s reform rationale and much of the 
current developmental discourse in China within the context of Leninist thought. Beyond 
concrete economic-policy outcomes, which often resemble the Japanese, Korean or 
Taiwanese post-war experience, China’s trajectory since 1978 is conceptualised by equal 
measure here as re-adaptation of Lenin’s New Economic Policy. Creative lesson drawing 
and policy transfers from other countries served at the same time the overarching goal of 
harnessing the global system of capitalism selectively toward state-led development.  
 
The discussion will be organized into two complementary parts. Section 2 critically 
evaluates the emergence and rationale of China as a modern nation-state. Section 3 then 
establishes connections and tensions between developmental statism (including its putative 
effect, political democratization) and residual Soviet-style corporatism. The concluding 
section synthesizes the foregoing analysis and offers a framework that is capable of 
explaining the selective adaptation of neoliberal logics in Chinese political-economic 
evolution within a context of deepening global economic integration and against the 
backdrop of Leninist state capitalism.  
 
2. China as a (capitalist) state 
 
The modern state, as Holloway (1994: 32) sees it, should not be construed as a rigidified 
entity that contains a definitive ‘national capitalism’; rather, through actively (re)producing the 
conditions and relations of production within what has become a predominantly capitalist 
global economy, the state exists in a co-constitutive relationship with capital accumulation. 
 
If all national states – regardless of governance ideologies – are defined in relation to 
the transnational capital accumulation dynamic, it might then be more plausible to view the 
national territorial scale not so much as a temporally-static and geographically-
homogeneous whole. Indeed, the national scale of socioeconomic regulation has been 
dynamically constituted by – and in turn re-constructed – processes occurring at the 
subnational and international scales (Massey, 1984; Peck, 2002; Brenner 2004). How state 
apparatuses ‘relate’ to the ‘totality of capitalist social relations’, Harvey (2005a: 81) explains, 
is predicated on an active and regular reconstruction of what constitutes the national.  
 
Glassman’s (1999: 673) processual notion of states adds yet another dimension to the 
concept of the ‘interventionist state’: a state is fundamentally “a process in which the state 
apparatus becomes increasingly oriented towards facilitating capital accumulation for the 
most internationalized investors, regardless of their nationality.” As Glassman (2004: 41) 
adds, “states should not be seen as anchored solely to those social forces designated as 
falling within the state’s formal realm of territorial authority”.  
 
In tandem with large-scale territorial decolonization after WWII, multiple state institutions 
have become entwined in an inherently capricious, competitive and often tension-filled 
relationship with the logic of capital accumulation (ref. Desai, 2013; cf. Harvey, 1985; 
Jessop, 2015). One of these states is CPC-governed ‘new China’. After its revolutionary 
success, the CPC was originally committed to a gradual transition to socialism. Underpinning 
this gradualism were differences in opinions amongst the top policymaking circles on how to 
inherit the agricultural economies run by middle and rich peasants. What ensued in the early 
1950s was a willingness – even on the part of Mao Zedong – to accommodate private 
enterprise and landownership.  
 
Taken together, these developments bear striking similarity to Leninist ‘state capitalism’.  
First introduced by the Russian revolutionary leader, Vladimir Lenin, following the victory 
over tsarism in 1918, ‘state capitalism’ refers to the state’s control of key factors of 
production while leaving room for private capital accumulation. It was, pace Lenin, a 
transitional stage between capitalism and socialism in which Russia was situated but of 
which fast-industrialisng Germany was the epitome in 1918. Lenin believed socialism was 
inconceivable without large-scale capitalist engineering feats drawing on cutting-edge 
technology borrowed from the developed world. Nonetheless, he prophetically observed that 
state capitalism in Germany at the time was at the behest of junker bourgeoisie and would 
therefore end in militarism, whereas in Russia a (self-perceived) proletariat steering could 
use it to yield socialist outcomes (Buick and Crump, 1986; Desai 2004, 136-135). Notably, 
however, state capitalism behoved coordination with and concessions to capitalists in both 
settings with a view toward limiting private enterprise and guiding it according to state 
priorities (Ball, 1990). 
 
Between 1918 and 1922, Lenin put in place the New Economic Policy (NEP or Novaya 
Ekonomicheskaya Politika). It is widely seen as the reintroduction of private initiative to the 
preceding system of compulsory requisition known as ‘War Communism’, during which the 
Soviet economy was negatively affected. Central to this was an awareness that an instant 
adaptation of communism was impossible because of the large peasant base. Rather, Lenin 
introduced a tax – the prodnalog – that was lower than the levels forcibly collected from 
peasants during the civil war. Peasants could then retain and sell the surplus, which offered 
an incentive to raise production. The process is summed up in Lenin’s terms (rep. 1966, vol. 
33, p. 64):  
The New Economic Policy means substituting a tax for the requisitioning of food; it means 
reverting to capitalism to a considerable extent—to what extent we do not know. Concessions 
to foreign capitalists (true, only very few have been accepted, especially when compared with 
the number we have offered) and leasing enterprises to private capitalists definitely mean 
restoring capitalism, and this is part and parcel of the New Economic Policy; for the abolition of 
the surplus-food appropriation system means allowing the peasants to trade freely in their 
surplus agricultural produce, in whatever is left over after the tax is collected—and the tax~ 
takes only a small share of that produce. The peasants constitute a huge section of our 
population and of our entire economy, and that is why capitalism must grow out of this soil of 
free trading.  
 
As is well-documented, the NEP was unable to support the state enterprises in the 
cities as grains remained in short supply. Attributing this to the profiteering tendencies of 
increasingly influential peasants (the kulaks), Josef Stalin, Lenin’s successor, abolished the 
NEP and re-introduced totalizing state control over production in 1928. What followed was a 
state-led model of industrialization that prioritized urban development and which led to the 
detention, suppression and execution of several million kulaks (Kuromiya, 1990; Hughes, 
1998; Viola, 2007).  
In an intriguing analysis, Li (2006) argues that Mao strongly admired the Soviet 
experiences of developing socialism in the 1920s and 1930s, as described in Joseph Stalin’s 
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course. So deeply-
rooted was Mao’s Soviet – or, more precisely, Stalin – envy, he paradoxically chose to 
overlook Stalin’s later advice for a gradualist transition. Instead, as Li (2006: 3) observes, 
Mao “relied on this work [the Short Course] as a roadmap to lead China to socialism”. The 
CPC’s total commitment to replicate the Soviet experience could be seen clearly in a 1953 
speech by Deng Zihui, one of the ‘five horses’ deployed from the six administrative regions 
to Beijing along with Gao Gang and Rao Shushi. As Deng puts it, the CPC equated its 
developmental trajectory with Soviet history: 
It must first be made clear what is called a transition period. I think fellow comrades are all 
clear, the revolution in China is divided into two stages: the first stage is New Democratic 
revolution; the second stage is socialist revolution. The first stage does preparatory work for 
the second stage, it prepares the conditions for socialist revolution in the second stage, the 
first New Democratic revolutionary stage has concluded, it has finished, it has passed…The 
Soviet Union implemented the New Economic Policy from 1921 to the time the first five year 
plan was launched in 1929, that was a transition period. Our current transition period is 
basically the same as that of the Soviet Union. (Deng Zihui, 2006: 182-185; authors’ 
translation) 
By Deng Zihui’s account, the CPC’s planning logic could be interpreted according to this 
periodization: pre-1953 state-building was Leninistic, while the post-1953 transition period, 
beginning with China’s First Five-Year Plan in 1953, was to take the form of Stalinization. 
This periodic shift was reflected by drastic adjustments to developmental policies between 
1953 and 1958. Under a quasi-bourgeois capitalist model (i.e. that adopted by Lenin), 
uneven economic-geographical development was at once contingent and necessary (cf. 
Harvey, 2005). A Stalinistic model, however, sought “balanced, proportionate development” 
across the whole country; by implication, uneven development was a contingency that could 
and had to be eased so long as its primary cause – the bourgeoisie – was first exterminated.  
The repudiation process was first enabled by the confiscation and redistribution of 
land, the primary means of production for the majority of Chinese citizens at the time. It was 
introduced in June 1950 as the Agrarian Reform Law (土地改革法) and implemented over 
two years. Land, farming tools and animals were confiscated from landlords – labelled by the 
state apparatus as ‘class enemies’ – and reallocated to peasants and sharecroppers across 
the country. As Bramall (2004) shows, this wave of land reforms did not enhance 
egalitarianism and raise output; it was a function of intensifying CPC control of the economy. 
Underpinning this version of state capitalism was a re-adaptation – not renouncement – of 
capitalistic techniques. As Howe (1973) shows, accounting rules for defining the components 
of enterprise wage bills remained unchanged until 1965, while rules for calculating minimum 
wages in 1957 were the same as those in 1948. Land titling rights were also largely 
unchanged in the cities, which mean private ownership remained a legal possibility there 
throughout Mao’s tenure (Hua, 2009).  What ensued, then, was a removal of the private 
capitalists without totally uprooting the laws of capital accumulation.  
 
Employing Marx’s dichotomous base-superstructure conceptualization of politico-
economic development, Mao inverted Stalin’s focus on the primacy of the economic ‘base’ 
by prioritizing the importance of the ‘superstructure’. Emphasizing ‘politics’ meant the 
integration of ideological lines and the notion of ‘permanent revolution’ into daily economic 
practices across the communes and state enterprises (Schram, 1971; Walder, 2015; 
Dikötter, 2016; Liu, 2016).  
Faced with the catastrophic upshot of the Great Leap Forward, senior CPC cadres 
like Liu Shaoqi, Li Fuchun and Deng Xiaoping sought to re-introduce private initiatives in 
order to boost output. Schurmann (1964) likened the economic recovery of the early 1960s 
to be a renewed attempt to launch the ‘New Economic Policy’, though he also presciently 
noted – in view of the brutal campaigns of the Cultural Revolution during and after 1966 – 
signs that China “may be approaching another 1928”. What this reveals was a strong 
undercurrent within the senior CPC leadership that capitalistic techniques as recommended 
by the NEP were fundamental to socialist construction. Mao did not agree and went on to 
label Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping as ‘capitalist roaders’ at the onset of the Cultural 
Revolution.  
Any meaningful attempt at reinstating NEP-styled reforms came only after Deng 
successfully out-maneuvered Mao’s appointed successor, Hua Guofeng, in 1978. Deng 
would subsequently affirm the value of the NEP during a meeting with Zimbabwe’s Prime 
Minister, Robert Mugabe, in August 1985: “What really is the appearance of socialism, even 
the Soviet Union could not be completely clear despite working on it for many years. Maybe 
Lenin’s line of thought is better, he developed a New Economic Policy, although the Soviet 
model subsequently stiffened” (Deng, 1993: 139, authors’ translation). In fact, the two latest 
most comprehensive biographies of Deng – whilst at loggerheads on the overall assessment 
of his legacy – both concur that he remained a committed Marxist who had been inspired by 
Lenin's New Economic Policy throughout his life: the NEP rationale thus underlay in no small 
measure not just much of the land reform in the early 1950s and the move away from the 
Great Leap Forward in the early 1960s, but also Deng's open-door policy (gaige kaifang) in 
the 1980s. To be sure, Deng's favouring of foreign investment had also been inspired by his 
1978 visit to 'capitalistic' Singapore but that aspect was more pragmatic than ideological. 
Suffice it to mention here that Deng was in fact equally impressed by Singapore's top-down 
'social engineering', e.g. its heady public housing scheme (Pantsov and Levine 2015: 7, 38, 
211-218, 373; Vogel 2011:24-26).2   
 
By contrast, the  biggest faux pas in the Mao era had arguably been its belief that 
national economic competitiveness could be attained within an insulated system of 
production (Whyte, 2012). As the next section will elaborate, however, it was Deng's 
commitment to re-engage with Leninist state capitalism that underpinned marketization and 
liberalization reforms and which, crucially, distinguishes in part the Chinese variant of  
'developmentalism' from the other East Asian economies. 
 
3. Is China a developmental state? 
 
The notion of the East Asian ‘developmental state’ has received significant research 
attention in political economic research over the past three decades. This began with 
Johnson’s (1982) seminal study of post-WWII socioeconomic policies by Japan’s Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). While there are multiple definitions of the 
‘developmental state’, scholars agree that this state form is characterized by (a) a 
nationalistic and authoritarian state committed ideologically to augmenting the competitive 
advantage of domestic firms and grooming them to become leading global exporters; (b) the 
willingness to facilitate a favourable domestic environment through protectionist international 
trade policies, macroeconomic policies that ensure devalued currency and interest rate 
stability; and (c) the existence of relatively homogeneous and egalitarian populations that 
were ready to work with the state to drive growth. (see, for instance, Öniş et al, 1991; 
                                                          
2 As Vogel (2011: 290-291) perceptively notes, before Deng's visit Singapore had routinely been described as a 
running dog of American imperialism in the PRC press. After his visit that press started describing Singapore as 
an impressive hub of economic modernisation that was well worth studying. In line with briefing he received 
from  local left-wing informers, Deng naively expected throngs of Singaporeans to greet him upon arrival. B 
Following meetings with the thoroughly-Anglicised Lee Kwan Yeo -- Deng  realised Singaporean society hadin 
fact become much more self-determined and free-wheeling than he had imagined, notwithstanding that it was 
majority ethnic-Chinese.   
Grabowski, 1994; Johnson, 1995; Huff et al, 2001; for an excellent definitional review, see 
Stubbs, 2009).  
Observers found this variant of state-led development especially fascinating vis- à-vis 
other state forms – in particular the neoliberal prototype based on free market principles. 
This is because developmental states managed to deliver high GDP growth rate over a 
relatively short period of time through state-identified ‘champion’ industries.   Such was the 
success of the Japanese experience in the 1970s that Vogel (1981) famously touted it could 
supersede the free-market-oriented USA as the number one economy in the world.  
 
Through the 1980s (and sporadically since), Japanese policymakers and think tanks 
began to promote the Japanese experience as an alternative to Western-style free market 
capitalism. Ironically, this ambition was viewed in East Asia as rekindling the 'Flying Geece’ 
paradigm that had underpinned Japanese imperial ambitions during WWII: Japan would be 
the ‘lead goose’ that elevate other East Asian economies along the industrialization flight 
trajectory insofar as these economies are integrated within a regional division of labour 
driven by Japanese firms (for an overview, see Kasahara, 2013; cf. Park, 2009). 
Yet, interestingly, the larger East Asian catch-up economies – namely South Korea 
and Taiwan – became increasingly successful precisely through circumventing any concrete 
or perceived hierarchy of Flying Geese in the 1980s-1990s. What they selectively adopted 
instead were key tenets of state-capital relations and export orientation first instituted in 
Japan yet designed to compete in the export of capital goods with the very same Japan. 
Evans (1995: 12) describes these tenets as “embedded autonomy”: an effective 
developmental state entails a bureaucracy that is capable of making decisions without being 
captured by private economic interests (autonomy), yet the state needs to be “embedded in 
a concrete set of social ties” and establish “institutionalised channels for the continual 
negotiation and renegotiation of policies” in order to avoid being disconnected from society 
(embeddedness). The term ‘selective’ is deliberate and deserves emphasis: the South 
Korean, Taiwanese and Singaporean states were arguably less ‘embedded’ socially than the 
Japanese government in that they were less inclined to encourage private firms to provide 
life-long employment and broad-based social benefits. More prominent was the ability of 
state bureaucracies to launch industrial policies in the name of national development, 
although these also varied in degrees (Huff, 1995; Amsden, 1992; Wade, 2003; Greene, 
2009). 
A particular streak of research on the developmental state – now extended to the 
analysis of the post-Mao Chinese political economy – is the attempt at cross-country 
comparison on the basis of an ideal-type template. This began in the late 1980s when 
Johnson (1988) developed his previously-mentioned thesis of post-WWII Japanese 
development into a comparison of government-business relationships in Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan. The literature was further developed through studies evaluating the state’s 
multi-dimensional relationships with capital, labour, political ideology (primarily liberal 
democracy) and the global economy (Douglass, 1994; Aoki et al, 1997; Doner et al, 2005). 
With the deepening of market reforms in China after the mid-1990s, scholars began to 
critically interrogate whether the developmental-state model is capable of explaining the 
changing conditions in China within a very short period of market-oriented reforms (Breslin, 
1996; Baek, 2005; Boltho and Weber, 2015; Beeson, 2009).  
This comparative engagement with the developmental state template can be very 
useful in providing a contemporary snapshot of where individual states stand in relation to 
one another. Table 1 shows how China stands at the current moment vis-à-vis Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore in terms of two well-defined concepts, namely Johnson’s 
(1982) industrial policy and Evans’ (1995) embedded autonomy. What this shows is not only 
how the Chinese experience differs from the other East Asian developmental states, but also 
how the others have creatively evolved since the 1970s. The paradox of this contribution is it 
accentuates the primary limit to this ideal-typical template: contrary to the ‘Flying Geese’ 
imagery of a ‘leading goose’ (Japan) taking a skein on an upward curve, there is no fixed 
historical spectrum of the developmental state along which one country can evolve insofar 
as specific conditions are met. This can be attributed to three reasons. 
Table 1. Can China be framed conceptually as a developmental state? A comparison with Japan, South Korea, Singapore & Taiwan 
Concept Characteristics Japan South Korea Taiwan Singapore China 
       
Embedded 
autonomy 
 Government 
agencies are 
embedded in 
socioeconomic 
affairs through direct 
information sharing 
& deliberation with 
key corporate 
players 
 At the same time, 
they remain 
autonomous from 
private interests, 
seeking instead to 
attain national-level 
developmental goals 
 Very strong 
between 1960s & 
early 1990s 
 State-firm relations 
increasingly 
decoupled in the 
wave of intense 
global competition, 
but possibly still the 
highest of the five 
countries 
 Firms show signs 
of retreat from 
social welfare 
provision 
 Very strong between 
1970s & early 1990s, 
albeit initially under 
state authoritarianism 
 Decoupling took place 
in financial realm 
which led to harsh 
outcomes during the 
1997 Asian financial 
crisis 
 Korean chaebols have 
since diversified 
ownership; Korean 
state became less 
embedded within 
corporate strategies 
 Not as embedded 
as that of Japan & 
South Korea during 
the 1950s & 60s; 
KMT implemented 
authoritarian 
control over 
socioeconomic life 
to ensure political 
survival 
 Room was created 
for large-scale 
growth of small & 
medium 
enterprises 
 
 Increasingly strong 
since the early 1970s; 
labor movement 
integrated within 
political structure & led 
by government 
minister 
 Private interests 
clearly autonomous, 
though strategies of 
government-linked 
firms overlapped with 
state & industrial 
policies (e.g. the 
regionalization drive) 
 Most intense 
embeddedness since 
1949, with the CPC 
directly in control of 
decision-making in firms 
& regulation of social life 
 Lowest autonomy of the 
five; despite SOE reforms 
in the 1980s & 1990s, 
both the party & the state 
directly impact SOE 
interests. Private firms 
are not explicitly part of 
industrial policies but their 
autonomy is constricted 
by the state  
 
Prevalence 
of industrial 
policy  
 Industrial policies 
affect industrial 
performances 
through state-driven 
adjustments of 
microeconomic 
variables 
 Involves sectoral 
targeting & 
deliberately ‘getting 
prices wrong’ 
 
 Very strong 
between 1960s & 
early 1990s; 
declined sharply 
thereafter 
 Bureaucratic 
influence over firms 
through 
microeconomic 
variables 
constrained by 
economic 
globalization 
 
 Very strong between 
1960s & early 1990s; 
declined sharply 
thereafter 
 Decline in 
bureaucratic prowess 
similar to the 
Japanese experience 
 Primarily evident 
through the 
national science 
policy aggressively 
pursued since 
global diplomatic 
recognition was 
significantly 
reduced during the 
1970s 
 Currently evident in 
biotech, hi-tech 
electronics & 
nuclear power  
 Remains high since 
the 1970s, but impact 
primarily government-
linked firms; overall 
effect is not as strong 
as in Japan, South 
Korea & China 
 Export-oriented policy 
of the 1970s remain, & 
there is minimum 
influence over the 
strategies of foreign 
capital 
 Very strong during the 
Mao era; emphasis on 
light industry in the three 
decades after 1978 as 
the CPC pursued export-
oriented growth 
 Grooming state-owned 
“national champions” in 
specific sectors like tele-
communications, 
aerospace engineering & 
automobiles 
 Enabled by ‘Go Abroad’ 
strategy 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation.
First, the ‘developmental state’ is neither a simple fact nor a static conceptual model: 
it is rather an approach which can be seen dynamically at work in different countries. It is, in 
other words, an entity that responds to the changing conditions of and pressures from both 
its domestic environment and the demands of the global economy for e.g. more skilled 
labour (Evans, 2008).  
 
To abstract and generalize from this fact is problematic given the different contextual 
conditions of other states. For this reason, the relevance of the developmental state 
framework vis-à-vis intensifying neoliberalizing processes is increasingly called into question 
over the last decade (see Glassman, 1999; Beeson and Islam, 2005). Reflecting on state-
business linkages in Korea, Kim (1999: 441) argues that the developmental state has 
gradually eroded as its power and capability “was increasingly affected by economic 
liberalization and political democratization” (see also Minns, 2001; Park, 2010; Yusuf, 2014).  
 
A similar decline in state activism, job security and social welfare is also observed of 
21st-Century Japan. In tandem with the Japanese state’s deployment of the ‘self-
responsibility’ discourse is the rise of ‘freeters’ (freelancer) and ‘haken-workers’ (temporarily-
contracted employment with minimum benefits). That decline amounts in effect to a retreat 
from the so-called 'three treasures' of Japanese industrial relations: lifetime employment, 
strong unions and guaranteed seniority pay (Honda, 2004; Hook and Hiroko, 2007).  
Pekkanen (2004) notes how the proliferation of civil society groups in Japan has been 
enabled by the decline in the bureaucracy’s political insulation. In its heyday, the Japanese 
bureaucracy was protected from disruptive influences from interest groups and civil 
groupings and could thus institute industrial policies unilaterally. Corresponding to emergent 
tendencies in South Korea and Taiwan, this changed following conscious application of 
neoliberal logics in Japan since the 1990s (Shibata, 2008). “While it is clear”, writes Beeson 
(2009: 20), “that Japan’s developmental state played a pivotal role in shaping its post-war 
recovery, it is equally apparent that it has become increasingly dysfunctional.”  
 On the other hand, there is a growing body of literature that points to the resilience of 
developmental-state thinking among East Asian elites even after the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997, and more so in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (e.g. Thurbon, 2016). 
Whereas in the US and Britain, neoliberal orthodoxy prevails for the most part on the back of 
the new knowledge economy, in East Asia one can more often than not find frequent 
recourse to the developmental catch-up toolbox even in democratic settings: the use of fiscal 
and monetary incentives to groom industries deemed strategic; or the deployment of price 
controls to drive down labour costs (Chu, 2016).  
Never the less, the private-sector ‘champion firms’ historically groomed by 
government in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – major examples being Sony, Samsung 
and Acer – have by now become transnational corporations (TNCs) in essence. These firms 
concomitantly prioritized the coordination of global production networks over the attainment 
of domestic developmental objectives. Their primary operational strategy has shifted from 
expanding and enhancing domestic manufacturing (which has been predominantly 
outsourced to different countries) to market control (which similarly extends beyond the 
home base). This not only explains why industrial policies have become increasingly 
ineffective in these countries; the attainment of social objectives (egalitarianism and growth) 
through moral suasion have been concomitantly destabilized (ref. Table 1).  
 
The partial rollback of the state vis-à-vis the TNC champions it had created itself 
means its “dominant actor” position in Japan and South Korea has diminished on balance in 
recent years. This arguably offers the CPC a major incentive to avoid wholesale imitation of 
their ‘developmentalist’ policies. As discussed in section 2, the CPC has re-adopted an 
authoritarian, Leninist variant of ‘state capitalism’, and research has demonstrated this 
approach was repurposed rather than jettisoned during the post-Mao era to facilitate the 
transition to a ‘socialist market economy’ (Huang, 2008; Lin, 2011; Coase and Wang, 2012). 
Otherwise put, the Chinese variant of “state capitalism” enshrines not just state-ownership of 
“national champions” but also CPC dominance therein (cf. Bremmer, 2010). At the same 
time, persistent and widespread state ownership arguably empowers society as a whole 
insofar as it retains a generous welfare-regime for those hordes of shop-floor workers that 
hung on to their posts through Zhu Rongji’s enforced down-sizing in the 1990s (Zweig, 2001; 
cf. Eaton, 2016; Wade, 2003, for South Korean and Taiwanese society). 
 
Initially, Deng had inverted Mao’s developmental focus in an effort to defer the tensions 
triggered by the incommensurability between capitalistic logics and geo-economic insulation. 
As is well known, the rural element in Deng's 1979 reform was embodied in the in the 
expansion of the Xiaogang-village-style style household responsibility system (baochan 
daohu) nation-wide, namely, effective de-collectivisation of land tilling along nuclear family 
lines. Not long after followed the setting up of Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs), meant 
to soak in excess labour in the countryside along the Eastern seaboard – something the 
larger urban SOEs never achieved. TVEs spread rapidly in response to the surge in 
consumer demand that followed the agricultural productivity spurt and higher income in the 
countryside in the early 1980s: they dealt in mainly labour-intensive pursuits where capital 
entry barriers to markets could not be effectively blocked by urban SOEs -- from apparel and 
hosiery, renovation materials, niche food and beverage, to small-scale coal mining. They 
came in many institutional shades too: in Southern Jiangsu, for example, they were mostly 
local-government run, in Wenzhou more local private ownership was allowed, and in 
Guangdong TVESs were commonly invested by Hong Kong business people (Naughton, 
2007, 271-293). 
 
Contrary to the negative reception towards foreign direct investments (FDIs) during 
the inception of the Japanese and Korean developmental states, the CPC adopted a ‘dual 
track’ developmental approach that emphasized reforms of rural production on the one hand 
and welcomed FDIs on the other. Concomitantly, the establishment of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) and subsequent ‘liberalization’ of city-regions nationwide for foreign capital 
inflows emphasized how China needed to accommodate – rather than negate – 
transnational capital circulation if the CPC wanted to secure perpetual rule (ref. the state as 
a function of global capitalism in section 2). Relative to Yeung’s (2014) postulation, Chinese 
SOEs have not decoupled from the party-state apparatus as they partake in and drive new 
forms of global production over the last two decades. What ensued, rather, was a three-
pronged developmental approach where (1) TNCs were allowed to subcontract work with 
medium and small enterprises (many of which are privately-owned) across China or 
establish joint ventures with SOEs if the aim was to produce for domestic consumption 
(Yang, 2014); (2) financial capital was re-concentrated in central hands through a series of 
repressive policies, in turn enabling the state to finance SOE and local state projects in spite 
of perceived inefficiencies (Shih, 2008; Huang and Wang, 2011; Johansson, 2012); (3) 
SOEs (including state-owned banks) underwent a series of corporatization and consolidation 
reforms (Aivazian et al, 2005; Chiu and Lewis, 2006). Officially termed ‘catching the big and 
releasing the small’ (zhuada fangxiao), the latter approach not only strengthened the 
economic capacities of Chinese SOEs vis-à-vis those of other national economies, they are 
now strongly encouraged to participate in the global system of capitalism through a state-
driven ‘Go Abroad’ program (Nolan, 2012; Kowalski et al, 2013). 
Notwithstanding the CPC’s Marxist rhetoric, the persistence of corporatism might 
also partly explain the third feature of the Chinese-style developmental state. As Kim (2009: 
383) shows, the developmental state elsewhere in northeast Asia was an outcome of a 
political-ideological commitment to break away from colonial-styled governance structures 
and lay the groundwork for socio-spatial egalitarianism. 
What emerged on balance since the CPC took over in 1949 was entrenched uneven 
regional development, however. While the CPC inherited a mix of extractive institutions and 
practices from the same colonial entity – Japan – that governed Taiwan and South Korea, its 
commitment to egalitarianism was only the transient redistribution of agrarian land in the 
early 1950s. As is well known, individual wealth disparities as well as regional disparities 
have skyrocketed in China since 1979.  
 To be sure, what followed land reform in the 1950s was an enforced and eventually 
catastrophic collectivization of the means of production to facilitate state extraction of surplus 
value (ref. section 2). This was facilitated by the household registration (hukou) system of 
demographic regulation instituted in 1958. Modelled after the ‘internal passport’ system of 
the Soviet Union, the hukou system classified each Chinese citizen as either an ‘agricultural’ 
(nongmin 农民) or ‘non-agricultural’ resident (fei nongmin 非农民). A certain set of rights (and 
prohibitions) was associated with this classification, the primary of which was severely 
restricted movement between (rural) communes and/or (urban) industrial units (for a 
historical overview, see Cheng and Selden, 1994; Chan, 2009). 
 
So all in all, it may well be argued that Mao-era egalitarianism has been wound back 
in the name of Deng’s embrace of Leninist state capitalism. To be sure, the gini coefficient in 
the Mao era was very low, and the “equalizing effects” of his Cultural Revolution have left 
vivid rhetorical ammunition to this day for the critics of economic reform (see e.g. Wang, 
2011). Yet, it must be recalled that China’s whopping disparities and alienation between 
cities and villages -- as well as between regions --  were persistent if not exacerbated later in 
the Mao era (Whyte, 2010; Dikötter, 2016). In that sense, one has to beware of facile 
dichotomy. Uneven development – as a tenet of the Chinese developmental state – cannot 
be reduced to Deng’s legacy alone: in fact we find here some over-arching resonance. On 
the other hand, under the careful watch of the CPC, residual widespread state-ownership of 
key enterprises and industries has stopped China from degenerating into Latin-American-
style alienation of the capitalist class from the rest of society.      
 
Keeping labour power in place was the primary basis of the Soviet-inspired ‘price 
scissors’ developmental approach of the Mao-era. The hukou institution was retained to 
facilitate labour-intensive industrialization in the cities as marketizing reforms were set in 
motion. Even as individual household farming was reinstated in the early 1980s, surplus 
rural labour were to be denied social welfare offered to pre-existing urban residents when 
they moved to the urban-based factories. Municipal governments could therefore divert fiscal 
resources to capital-friendly projects and offer the ‘China price’ that has proven so 
competitive to global investors (ref. Harney, 2009). Despite attempts at reforms and 
widespread speculation of its abolishment, this system remains firmly in place today (Chan 
and Buckingham, 2008). Ironically, then, the sustained commitment to non-egalitarian 
development through the hukou system has become a vital enabler of what are termed local 
corporatist or local developmental states (ref. Oi, 1992; Zhu, 2004). In this regard, the 
apparent re-adaptation of Leninist state capitalism in the post-Mao era is in fact a fusion of 
Leninism, and new responses to the demands of global economic integration. 
  
Enthusiasts of the “China Model” are aware of the developmental hiatus during the 
Mao era, to be sure, and most of them flatly reject Mao’s economic legacy. By contrast, they 
point out that the Chinese trajectory has one compelling feature that is superior to the other 
East Asian developmental states; one that might usher China into the technological frontier, 
help it become globally more competitive and attain high income in due course: namely, 
greater receptivity to foreign direct investment (FDI). Remarkably, in 2014 China has 
overtaken the USA to become the largest destination of FDI in the world (Chen 2011) .  
 
Attitudes to FDI in post-war Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan could arguably not 
be more different. As Simon Bytheway (2014) has recently shown, in fact, there has been 
less FDI coming into Japan in relative terms in the post-war years that during the pre-war 
era. Notably, even between 1860s and 1930s Japan mainly relied on loans and bond 
issuance in overseas securities markets to raise much needed capital rather than lure in 
foreign investors and foreign entrepreneurs per se. Foreign borrowing thus financed the 
establishment of infrastructure in Japan’s largest cities, the nationalization of railways, and 
the rapid electrification of Japanese industry in the 1920s. To this day, there are in Japan 
relatively very few local-foreign joint ventures; foreign shareholders or directors in the 
Japanese corporate world are a fairly rare sight – foreign investment and ownership as a 
whole, one might observe, is discouraged.   
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the developmental experience of 
China was and remains in some ways distinct from those of other East Asian developmental 
states. In spite of superficial similarities, underpinning market-oriented reforms in post-Mao 
China is a sustained preference on the part of the CPC for strong control over the means 
and relations of production. It would be problematicto assume China can be neatly 
categorized as yet another East Asian developmental state (Wong, 2004; Beeson, 2009; 
Chen and Lees, 2016; So, 2016). Rather, the developmental process in post-Mao China has 
been one of selective adaptation and borrowing from the East Asian toolkit.  
 
In order to reinstate and develop Leninistic state capitalism as discussed in section 2, 
one aspect classically borrowed from the East Asian experience was financial repression. 
Arguably the most contentious dimension of the East Asian developmental-state trajectory in 
the 20th century, at least in the eyes of economists of rigid neo-classical persuasion, is 
“financial repression”. What the term broadly conveys is the notion that banks in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan throughout the post-war era have, at the behest of government, 
cheapened credit to a select group of hand-picked industrial export-geared firms at the 
expense of captive ‘mom-and-pop’ savers. That the overall private saving rate in East Asia 
remained high nevertheless is usually attributed to the government depriving individuals from 
alternative, more remunerative “financial instruments”. Moreover, in China, the banking 
system is still largely state-owned, thus the case for “repression” in the domestic economy is, 
in neo-classical parlance, even more severe. Indeed, pernicious credit discrimination 
between state-favoured large firms and bottom-up entrepreneurs has become the bugbear 
of not just foreign analysts like Nicholas Lardy (2008) but also China’s own neo-classical 
minded economists.3  
And yet recent, partly dissenting studies like that of Eun Young Oh (2011) offer a 
more nuanced picture. In Oh’s view, South Korea’s remarkable economic growth in the 
1980s was in no small measure a product of “…government intervention such as channelling 
resources in selected industrial sectors which can significantly increase the efficiency of 
credit allocation”. Oh further alludes to the fact that East-Asian style “financial repression” 
can assist other emerging economies. Huang and Wang similarly opine that in a transitional, 
largely-rural setting, Chinese economic planners were vindicated in instituting “financial 
repression” at least until the 2000s. They find circumstantial evidence to support the case 
that “repressive” policies on balance helped Chinese economic growth overall, but conclude 
that the pace of financial-market reform has since fallen behind, and does no longer suit the 
re-vaped Chines economy (Huang and Wang, 2011). 
A study of the factors behind Japan’s economic malaise since the “lost decade” of 
the 1990s is beset by much the same contention. On the one extreme, influential accounts 
such as Japan: the System that Soured by Richard Katz posited in the late 1990s that the 
Japanese economy is still heavily regulated as if it was still in a catch-up mode. Keeping a 
developmental state mind-set, the gerrymandered Japanese political establishment no 
longer promotes industrial export-geared “winners” and full employment. Rather, in Katz’ 
view, it shields inefficient domestic-market-geared “losers” (particularly well-connected 
property developers) from competition at home and from cheaper imports, whilst letting them 
move jobs and invest more and more overseas. The way this is done, according to Katz, is 
through bank excessive cross-shareholding in these ‘loser’ firms (the notorious keirestu link), 
on the one hand, and by all-too-cosy relations between government bureaucrats and the 
banks. At heart, then is “financial repression” again: banks “too big and powerful” directing 
                                                          
3 The best-known Chinese economists who have raised criticism in that vein include Zhang Weiying, Wu 
Jinglian and Yu Maoshi. Proponents of state-led banking include the New left, Neo Maoists and Hu Angang. 
See e.g. China 3.0 edited by Mark Leonard, published online 2012 by European Council on Foreign Relations. 
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR66_CHINA_30_final.pdf 
 
cheaper capital to cronies, and paying little to no interest to small-time depositors (Katz, 
1998, mainly Chapter 14). 
But Katz’s conventional neo-classical storyline has since been challenged. To be 
sure, in China that explanation has never fully sunk in. Instead, commentators on the other 
extreme believe it was the US that craftily foisted the “lost decade” on the Japanese 
economy through the 1985 Plaza Accord because of geo-political concern for American 
global primacy if the Japanese economy continued to grow. Much more importantly, more 
recent Western economic accounts like that of Richard Grossman’s suggest that, far from a 
case of government over-regulation, the roots of Japan’s “Lost Decade” can actually be 
traced back to excessive financial de-regulation in the early 1980s, allowing keirestu 
(diversified bank-centered conglomerates) to float corporate debt through bond issuance. 
Since Japan’s saving rate did not diminish as a result, and since export-geared keiretsu 
were less in need of bank credit, Japanese banks were left with excess capital to lend out. 
That “easy credit” was channelled to realty, resulting in a pernicious asset bubble not unlike 
the one afflicting China in the late 2000s (Grossman, 2010: 276-281). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The ‘freedom’ associated with 'pure' neoliberal reasoning is often underpinned in 
practice by proactive state intervention. As Niall Ferguson (2001: 90) concedes, as late as 
the 18th century, even the minimalist British “night watchman” state had in fact to rely on 
government monopolies and postal services to partly defray empire-building alongside 
excise and customs. Similarly, Paul Bairoch (1993) famously described America’s economic 
path to economic might, before its later 20th century association with neo-liberalism, as one 
based on state planning, mercantilism and “protectionism”.  
 
It is often observed in this context that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan had all 
enacted re-distributional rural land reform under American auspices in the 1950s so as to 
mitigate peasant militancy and immiseration of the kind that -- many Westerners believed – 
led to the rise of the CPC. Indeed, the CPC itself staked its claim to authority on the rural 
land reform it carried out in North China whilst still in the underground. After it came to power 
in 1949, the CPC continued with a more moderate form of land reform, improving the plight 
of millions of smallholders and tenant tillers, but often executing wealthy land owners. In the 
early 1960s, however, smallholding was undone by the collectivisation of land during the 
Great Leap Forward, hence the break from the East Asian developmental mode right until 
Deng Xiaoping re-took the reins in 1979 to re-enshrine 'market gardening' (Studwell, 2013).  
Granted, therere appear to be many policy similarities across the East Asian 
spectrum. China does appear to neatly fit the developmental-state mould  in terms of its 
early rural land reform,  export orientation, and its current preference for 'financial 
repression'. Nevertheless, the CPC’s direct economic involvement in the large state-owned 
sector and its spatially and socially uneven development pattern capture what we have 
called here the Chinese variant of the East Asian developmental state. In that sense, we do 
not presuppose or seek an ideal-typical entity known as a “developmental state” (cf. Knoight, 
2013). . Rather, China's overall trajectory is characterized by a re-adaptation of Lenin’s New 
Economic Policy on the one hand and creative lesson drawing and policy transfers from 
other countries on the other hand. The overarching goal, it appears, is to secure freedom to 
engage the global system of capitalism while keeping intact its primary domestic focus of 
state-led development.  
 
For these reasons, there are ample grounds upon which to assume the CPC has and 
will continue to differentiate itself developmentally and ideationally from neoliberalism while 
simultaneously championing global- free trade. Even democratization, widely heralded as 
the corollary of free markets, does not guarantee social equity. Rather, democratic polities in 
the West, East and South are all currently witnessing growing levels of inequality as a 
consequence of economic deregulation. Put in Leninist parlance, China’s state capitalism is 
meant to deliver equality in the long-run precisely through ideological commitment to the 
maintenance of large SOEs in the “commanding heights” of the economy. 
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